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Abstract
The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle
when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from
the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data
from many environments and finding invariant predictors reduces the
effect of spurious features by concentrating models on features that have a
causal relationship with the outcome. In this work, we pose such invariant
risk minimization as finding the Nash equilibrium of an ensemble game
among several environments. By doing so, we develop a simple training
algorithm that uses best response dynamics and, in our experiments,
yields similar or better empirical accuracy with much lower variance than
the challenging bi-level optimization problem of [1]. One key theoretical
contribution is showing that the set of Nash equilibria for the proposed
game are equivalent to the set of invariant predictors for any finite number
of environments, even with nonlinear classifiers and transformations. As
a result, our method also retains the generalization guarantees to a large
set of environments shown in [1]. The proposed algorithm adds to the
collection of successful game-theoretic machine learning algorithms such
as generative adversarial networks.
1 Introduction
The annals of machine learning are rife with embarrassing examples of spurious
correlations that fail to hold outside a specific training (and identically distributed
test) distribution. In [2] the authors trained a convolutional neural network
(CNN) to classify camels from cows. The training dataset had one source of
bias, i.e., most of the pictures of cows had green pastures, while most pictures
of camels were in deserts. The CNN picked up the spurious correlation, i.e., it
associated green pastures with cows and failed to classify pictures of cows on
sandy beaches correctly. In another case, a neural network used a brake light
indicator to continue applying brakes, which was a spurious correlation in the
training data [3]; the list of such examples goes on.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
04
69
2v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
8 M
ar 
20
20
To address the problem of models inheriting spurious correlations, the authors
in [1] show that one can exploit the varying degrees of spurious correlation
naturally present in data collected from multiple data sources to learn robust
predictors. The authors propose to find a representation Φ such that the optimal
classifier given Φ is invariant across training environments. This formulation
leads to a challenging bi-level optimization, which the authors relax by fixing a
simple linear classifier and learning a representation Φ such that the classifier is
“approximately locally optimal” in all the training environments.
In this work, we take a very different approach. We create an ensemble of
classifiers with each environment controlling one component of the ensemble.
Each environment uses the entire ensemble to make predictions. We let all
the environments play a game where each environment’s action is to decide its
contribution to the ensemble such that it minimizes its risk. Remarkably, we
establish that the set of predictors that solve the ensemble game is equal to the
set of invariant predictors across the training environments; this result holds for
a large class of non-linear classifiers.
This brings us to the question: how do we solve the game? We use classic
best response dynamics [4], which has a very simple implementation. Each
environment periodically takes its turn and moves its classifier in the direction
that minimizes the risk specific to its environment. Empirically, we establish
that the invariant predictors found by our approach lead to better or comparable
performance with much lower standard deviation than [1] on several different
datasets. A nice consequence of our approach is we do not restrict classifiers to
be linear, which was emphasized as an important direction for future work by
[1].
Broadly speaking, we believe that the game-theoretic perspective herein can
open up a totally new paradigm to address the problem of invariance.
2 Related Work
2.1 Invariance Principles in Causality
The invariant risk minimization formulation of [1] is the most related work, and is
motivated from the theory of causality and causal Bayesian networks (CBNs) [5].
A variable y is caused by a set of non-spurious actual causal factors xPa(y) if and
only if in all environments where y has not been intervened on, the conditional
probability P (y|xPa(y)) remains invariant. This is called the modularity condition
[6]. Related and similar notions are the independent causal mechanism principle
[7, 8, 9] and the invariant causal prediction principle [10, 11]. These principles
imply that if all the environments (train and test) are modeled by interventions
that do not affect the causal mechanism of target variable y, then a classifier
conservatively trained on the transformation that involves the causal factors
(Φ(x) = xPa(y)) to predict y is robust to unseen interventions.
In general, for finite sets of environments, there may be other invariant
predictors. If one has information about the CBN structure, one can find invariant
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predictors that are maximally predictive using conditional independence tests
and other graph-theoretic tools [12, 13].
The above works select subsets of features, primarily using conditional
independence tests, that make the optimal classifier trained on the selected
features be invariant. In [1] the authors give an optimization-based reformulation
of this invariance that facilitates searching over transformations in a continuous
space, making their work widely applicable in areas such as computer vision
where the causal features are latent (see Figure 6 in [1]).
2.2 Sample Reweighting, Domain Adaptation, and Ro-
bust Optimization
Statistical machine learning has dealt with the distribution shift between the
training distribution and test distribution in a number of ways. Conventional
approaches are sample weighting, domain adaptation, and robust optimization.
Importance weighting or more generally sample weighting attempts to match
test and train distributions by reweighting samples [14, 15, 16, 17]. It typically
assumes that the probability of labels given all covariates does not shift, and in
more general cases, requires access to test labels. Domain adaptation tries to
find a representation Φ whose distribution is invariant across source and target
domains [18, 19, 20, 21]. Domain adaptation is known to have serious limitations
even when the marginal distribution of labels shift across environments [22, 23].
When only training data sources are given, robust optimization techniques find
the worst case loss over all possible convex combinations of the training sources
[24, 25, 26, 27]. This assumes that the test distribution is within the convex hull
of training distributions, which is not true in many settings.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Game Theory Concepts
We begin with some basic concepts from game theory [28] that we will use. Let
Γ = (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) be the tuple representing a standard normal form
game, where N is the finite set of players. Player i ∈ N takes actions from a
strategy set Si. The utility of player i is ui : S → R, where we write the joint set
S = Πi∈NSi. The joint strategy of all the players is given as s ∈ S, the strategy
of player i is si and the strategy of the rest of players is s−i = (si′ )i′ 6=i. If the
set S is finite, then we call the game Γ a finite game. If the set S is uncountably
infinite, then the game Γ is a continuous game.
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A strategy s∗ is said to be a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) if it satisfies
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(k, s∗−i),∀k ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N
We continue the discussion on other relevant concepts in game theory in the
Appendix Section.
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3.2 Invariant Risk Minimization
We describe the invariant risk minimization (IRM) of [1]. Consider datasets
{(xei , yei )}nei=1 from multiple training environments e ∈ Etr. The feature value
xei ∈ X and the corresponding labels yei ∈ Y, where X ⊆ Rn and Y ⊆ Rk.1
Define a predictor f : X → Rk.
The goal of IRM is to use these multiple datasets to construct a predictor
f that performs well across many unseen environments Eall. Define the risk
achieved by f in environment e as Re(f) = EXe,Y e
[
`(f(Xe), Y e)
]
, where ` is
the loss when f(X) is the predicted value and Y is the corresponding label. To
assume that f maps to real values is not restrictive; for instance, in a k-class
classification problem, the output of the function f is the score for each class,
which can be converted into a hard label by selecting the class with the highest
score.
Invariant predictor: We say that a data representation Φ : X → Z ⊆ Rd
elicits an invariant predictor w ◦ Φ across environments e ∈ E if there is a
classifier w : Z → Rk that achieves the minimum risk for all the environments
w ∈ arg minw¯∈Hw Re(w¯ ◦ Φ). The set of all the mappings Φ is given as HΦ and
the set of all the classifiers is given as Hw. IRM may be phrased as the following
constrained optimization problem [1]:
min
Φ∈HΦ,w∈Hw
∑
e∈Etr
Re(w ◦ Φ)
s.t. w ∈ arg min
w¯∈Hw
Re(w¯ ◦ Φ), ∀e ∈ Etr.
(1)
If (Φ, w) satisfies the above constraints, then w ◦ Φ is an invariant predictor
across the environments Etr.
Define the set of representations and the corresponding classifiers, (Φ, w)
that satisfy the constraints in the above optimization problem (1) as S IV, where
IV stands for invariant. Also, separately define the set of invariant predictors
w ◦ Φ as Sˆ IV = {w ◦ Φ |(Φ, w) ∈ S IV}.
Remark. The sets S IV, Sˆ IV depend on the choice of classifier class Hw and
representation class HΦ. We avoid making this dependence explicit until later
sections.
Members of S IV are equivalently expressed as the solutions to
Re(w ◦ Φ) ≤ Re(w¯ ◦ Φ), ∀w¯ ∈ Hw, ∀e ∈ Etr. (2)
The main result of [1] states that ifHw andHΦ are from the class of linear models,
i.e., w(z) = wtz, where w ∈ Rd, and Φ(x) = Φx with Φ ∈ Rd×n, then under
certain conditions on the data generation process and training environments Etr,
the solution to (2) remains invariant in Eall.
1The setup applies to both continuous and categorical data. If any feature or label is
categorical, we one-hot encode it.
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4 Ensemble Invariant Risk Minimization Games
4.1 Game-Theoretic Reformulation
Optimization problem (1) can be quite challenging to solve. We introduce an
alternate characterization based on game theory to solve it. We endow each
environment with its own classifier we ∈ Hw. We use a simple ensemble to
construct an overall classifier wav : Z → Rk defined as wav = 1|Etr|
∑|Etr|
q=1 w
q,
where for each z ∈ Z, wav(z) = 1|Etr|
∑|Etr|
q=1 w
q(z). (The av stands for average.)
Consider the example of binary classification with two environments {e1, e2};
we = [we1, w
e
2] is the classifier of environment e, where each component is the
score for each class. We define the component j of the ensemble classifier wav
as wavj =
w
e1
j +w
e2
j
2 . These scores are input to a softmax; the final probability
assigned to class j for an input z is e
wavj (z)
ew
av
1 (z)+ew
av
2 (z)
.
We require all the environments to use this ensemble wav. We want to solve
the following new optimization problem.
min
Φ∈HΦ,wav∈Hw
∑
e∈Etr
Re(wav ◦ Φ)
s.t. we ∈ arg min
w¯e∈Hw
Re
 1
|Etr|
[
w¯e +
∑
q 6=e
wq
]
◦ Φ
 , ∀e ∈ Etr
We can equivalently restate the above as:
min
Φ∈HΦ,wav
∑
e∈Etr
Re(wav ◦ Φ)
s.t. Re
 1
|Etr|
[
we +
∑
q 6=e
wq
]
◦ Φ

≤ Re
 1
|Etr|
[
w¯e +
∑
q 6=e
wq
]
◦ Φ
 ∀w¯e ∈ Hw ∀e ∈ Etr
(3)
What are the advantages of this formulation (3)?
• Using the ensemble automatically enforces invariance across environments.
• Each environment is free to select the classifier we from the entire set Hw,
unlike in (1), where all environments’ choices are required to be the same.
• The constraints in (3) are equivalent to the set of pure NE of a game that
we define next.
The game is played between |Etr| players, with each player corresponding to
an environment e. The set of actions of the environment e are we ∈ Hw. At
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the start of the game, a representation Φ is selected from the set HΦ, which
is observed by all the environments. The utility function for an environment e
is defined as ue[w
e, w−e,Φ] = −Re(wav,Φ), where w−e = {wq}q 6=e is the set of
choices of all environments but e. We call this game Ensemble Invariant Risk
Minimization (EIRM) and express it as a tuple
ΓEIRM =
(
Etr,HΦ, {Hw}|Etr|q=1 , {ue}e∈Etr
)
.
We represent a pure NE as a tuple
(
Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1
)
. Since each pure NE depends
on Φ, we include it as a part of the tuple.2 We define the set of pure NE as
SEIRM. We construct a set of all the ensemble predictors constructed from NE
as3
SˆEIRM =
{[ 1
|Etr|
|Etr|∑
q=1
wq
]
◦ Φ | (Φ, {wq}|Et|q=1) ∈ SEIRM
}
.
Members of SEIRM are equivalently expressed as the solutions to
ue[w
e, w−e,Φ] ≥ ue[w¯e, w−e,Φ], ∀we ∈ Hw,∀e ∈ Etr. (4)
If we replace ue[w
e, w−e,Φ] with −Re(wav,Φ), we obtain the inequalities in (3).
So far we have defined the game and given its relationship to the problem in (3).
4.2 Equivalence Between NE and Invariant Predictors
What is the relationship between the predictors obtained from NE SˆEIRM and
invariant predictors Sˆ IV?
Remarkably, these two sets are the same under very mild conditions. Before
we show this result, we establish a stronger result and this result will follow from
it.
We use the set SEIRM to construct a new set. To each tuple
(
Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 )
)
∈
SEIRM augment the ensemble classifier wav = 1|Etr|
∑|Etr|
q=1 w
q to get
(
Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , wav
)
.
We call the set of these new tuples S˜EIRM.
We use the set S IV to construct a new set. Consider an element (Φ, w) ∈ S IV.
We define a decomposition for w in terms of the environment-specific classifiers
as follows: w = 1|Etr|
∑|Etr|
q=1 w
q, where wq ∈ Hw. wq = w,∀q ∈ Etr is one trivial
decomposition. We use each such decomposition and augment the tuple to obtain(
Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w
)
. We call this set of new tuples S˜ IV.
Both the sets S˜ IV and S˜EIRM consist of tuples of representation, set of envi-
ronment specific classifiers, and the ensemble classifier. We ask an even more
interesting question than the one above. Is the set of representations, environ-
ment specific classifiers, and the ensembles found by playing EIRM (4) or solving
2We can also express each environment’s action as a mapping from pi : HΦ → Hw but we
don’t to avoid complicated notation.
3We don’t double count compositions leading to the same predictor.
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IRM (2) the same? If these two sets are equal, then equality between SˆEIRM and
Sˆ IV follows trivially.
We state the only assumption we need.
Assumption 1. Affine closure: The class of functions Hw is closed under
the following operations.
• Finite sum: If w1 ∈ Hw and w2 ∈ Hw, then w1 + w2 ∈ Hw, where for
every z ∈ Z, (w1 + w2)(z) = w1(z) + w2(z)
• Scalar multiplication: For any c ∈ R and w ∈ Hw, cw ∈ Hw, where for
every z ∈ Z, (cw)(z) = c× w(z)
The addition of the functions and scalar multiplication are defined in a
standard pointwise manner. Therefore, the class Hw also forms a vector space.
Examples of functions that satisfy affine closure. Linear classifiers,
kernel based classifiers [29] (functions in RKHS space), ensemble models with
arbitrary number of weak learners [30], functions in Lp space [31], ReLU networks
with arbitrary depth. We provide the justification for each of these functions in
the Appendix Section. We now state the main result.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then S˜ IV = S˜EIRM
The proofs of all the results are in the Appendix Section.
Corollary 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then Sˆ IV = SˆEIRM
Significance of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
• From a computational standpoint, this equivalence permits tools from
game theory to find NE of the EIRM game and, as a result, the invariant
predictors.
• From a theoretical standpoint, this equivalence permits to use game theory
to analyze the solutions of the EIRM game and understand the invariant
predictors.
• In Theorem 9 of [1], it was shown for linear classifiers and linear repre-
sentations that the invariant predictors generalize to a large set of unseen
environments under certain conditions. Since our result holds for linear
classifiers (but is even broader), the generalization result continues to hold
for the predictors found by playing the EIRM game.
Role of representation Φ. We investigate the scenario when we fix Φ to
the identity mapping; this will motivate one of our approaches. Define the set
SˆEIRM(Φ) as the set of ensemble predictors arrived at by playing the EIRM game
using a fixed representation representation Φ.4 Similarly, we define a set Sˆ IV(Φ)
as the set of invariant predictors derived using the representation Φ. From
Theorem 1, it follows that SˆEIRM(Φ) = Sˆ IV(Φ). We modify some of the earlier
notations for results to follow. The set of predictors that result from the EIRM
game SˆEIRM and the sets of invariant predictors Sˆ IV are defined for a family of
maps Φ with co-domain Z. We make the co-domain Z explicit in the notation.
We write SˆEIRMZ for SˆEIRM and Sˆ IVZ for Sˆ IV.
4∪ΦSˆEIRM(Φ) = SˆEIRM
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Assumption 2. Φ ∈ HΦ satisfies the following
• Bijective: ∃ Φ−1 : Z → X such that ∀x ∈ X ,
(
Φ−1 ◦ Φ
)
(x) = x, and
∀z ∈ Z
(
Φ ◦ Φ−1
)
(z) = z. Both X and Z are subsets of Rn
• Φ is differentiable and Lipschitz continuous.
We define Lp(Z) as the set of functions f : Z → R s.t. ∫Z |f |pdµ <∞
Assumption 3. Hw = Lp(Z).
Define a subset S¯ IVZ ⊆ Sˆ IVZ consisting of invariant predictors that are in Lp(X ),
i.e., S¯ IVZ = {u | u ∈ Sˆ IVZ and u ∈ Lp(X )}. Let Φ = I, where I : X → X is the
identity mapping. Following the above notation, the set of invariant predictors
and the set of ensemble predictors obtained from NE are Sˆ IVX (I) and SˆEIRMX (I)
respectively.
Theorem 2. If Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied and S¯ IVZ is non-empty, then
S¯ IVZ = Sˆ IVX (I) = SˆEIRMX (I)
Significance of Theorem 2. If we fix the representation to identity and
play the EIRM game, then it is sufficient to recover all the invariant predictors
(with bounded Lp norm) that can be obtained using all the representations
Φ ∈ HΦ. Therefore, we can simply fix Φ = I and use game-theoretic algorithms
for learning equilibria.
4.3 Existence of NE of ΓEIRM and Invariant Predictors
In this section, we first argue that there are many settings when both invariant
predictors and the NE exist.
Illustration through generative models. We use a simplified version
of the model described by [10]. In each environment e, the random variable
Xe = [Xe1 , ..., X
e
n] corresponds to the feature vector and Y
e corresponds to the
label. The data for each environment is generated by i.i.d. sampling (Xe, Y e)
from the following generative model. Assume a subset S∗ ⊂ {1, ..., n} is causal
for the label Y e. For all the environments e, Xe has an arbitrary distribution
and
Y e = g(XeS∗) + 
e
where XeS∗ is the vector X
e with indices in S∗, g : R|S∗| → R is some underlying
function and e ∼ F e, E[e] = 0, e ⊥ XeS∗ . Let ` be the squared error
loss function. We fix the representation Φ∗(Xe) = XeS∗ . With Φ
∗ as the
representation, the optimal classifier w among all the functions is g(XeS∗) (this
follows from the generative model). If we assume that g ∈ Hw, then for each
environment e, we∗ = g is the optimal classifier in Hw. Therefore, we∗ ◦ Φ∗ = g is
the invariant predictor. If Hw satisfies affine closure, then any decomposition
of g is a pure NE of the EIRM game. We have illustrated existence of NE and
invariant predictor when the data is generated as above and when the class Hw
is sufficiently expressive to capture g. Next, we discuss the case when we do not
know anything about the underlying data generation process.
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Assumption 4. • Hw is a class of linear models, where w : Z → R and
w(z) = wtz, where z ∈ Z. We write Hw as the set of vectors w. Hw is a
closed, bounded and convex set. The interior of Hw is non-empty.
• The loss function `(wtz, Y ), where Y ∈ R is the label, is convex and contin-
uous in w. For e.g., if loss is cross-entropy for binary classification or loss
is mean squared error for regression, then this assumption is automatically
satisfied.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 4 is satisfied, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game ΓEIRM exists. If the weights of all the individual classifiers in the
NE are in the interior of Hw, then the corresponding ensemble predictor is an
invariant predictor among all the linear models.
The family Hw of bounded linear functions does not satisfy affine closure,
which is why existence of NE does not immediately imply the existence of
invariant predictor (from Theorem 1). However, if the solution is in the interior
of Hw , then it is the globally optimal solution among all the linear functions,
which in fact actually satisfy affine closure. As a result, in this case the invariant
predictor also exists.
Significance of Theorem 3 Our approach is based on finding the NE.
Therefore, it is important to understand when the solutions are guaranteed to
exist. In the above theorem, we proved the result for linear models only, but
there were no assumptions made on the representation class. In the Appendix
Section, we show that for a large class of models, pure NE may not exist but
mixed NE (a relaxation of pure NE) are guaranteed to exist. Following the
sufficient condition for existence of invariant predictors, understanding what
conditions cause the NEs to be in the interior or on the boundary of Hw can
help further the theory of invariant prediction.
4.4 Algorithms for Finding NE of ΓEIRM
There are different strategies in the literature to compute the equilibrium, such
as best response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious play [4], but none of these
strategies are guaranteed to arrive at equilibria in continuous games except for
special classes of games [32, 33, 34, 35]. BRD is one the most popular methods
given its intuitive and natural structure. The training of GANs also follows an
approximate BRD [36]. BRD is not known to converge to equilibrium in GANs.
Instead a modification of it proposed recently, [37] achieves mixed NE. Our game
ΓEIRM is a non-zero sum game with continuous actions unlike GANs. Since there
are no known techniques that are guaranteed to compute the equilibrium (pure
or mixed) for these games, we adopt the classic BRD approach.
In our first approach, we use a fixed representation Φ. Recall in Theorem 2,
we showed how just fixing Φ to identity can be a very effective approach. Hence,
we can fix Φ to be identity mapping or we can select Φ as some other mapping
such as approximation of the map for Gaussian kernel [38]. Once we fix Φ, the
environments play according to best response dynamics as follows.
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• Each environment takes its turn (in a periodic manner with each environ-
ment going once) and minimizes its respective objective.
• Repeat this procedure until a certain criterion is achieved, e.g., maximum
number of epochs or desired value of training accuracy.
The above approach does not give much room to optimize Φ. We go back to
the formulation in (3) and use the upper level optimization objective as a way
to guide search for Φ. In this new approach, Φ is updated by the representation
learner periodically using the objective in (3) and between two updates of Φ the
environments play according to best response dynamics as described above.
We now make assumptions on Hw and HΦ and give a detailed algorithm (see
Algorithm 1) that we use in experiments. We assume that we is parametrized
by family of neural networks θw ∈ Θw and Φ is parametrized by family of neural
networks θΦ ∈ ΘΦ. In the Algorithm 1, one of the variables Fixed-Phi (for our
first approach) or Variable-Phi is set to true, and then accordingly Φ remains
fixed or is updated periodically. In Figure 1, we also show an illustration of the
best response training when there are two environments and one representation
learner.
Aggregate
Backprop  
Environment 1
Loss Environment 1
Loss 
representation
Loss Environment 2Backprop 
Environment 2
Backprop
representation
𝑤": Environment 1
𝑤#: Environment 2
Backprop
representation
Φ: Representation learner
Figure 1: Illustration of best response training with 2 environments and repre-
sentation learner. Dotted lines for backpropagation and solid lines for forward
pass.
5 Experiments
5.1 Benchmarks
The most important benchmark for comparison is [1], which we refer to as IRM
in the comparisons. We use the architecture described in their work (details in
the Appendix Section). We also compare with
• Variants of empirical risk minimization: ERM on entire training data
(ERM), ERM on each environment separately (ERM e refers to ERM
trained on environment e), and ERM on data with no spurious correlations.
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Algorithm 1 Best Response Training
Input: Data for each environment and combined data
while iter ≤ itermax do
if Fixed-Phi then
Φcur = I
end if
if Variable-Phi then
Φnxt = SGD
[∑
eR
e(wavcur◦Φcur)
]
, SGD[.]: update using stochastic gradient
descent
Φcur = Φnxt
end if
for p ∈ {1, ..K} do
for e ∈ {1, .., |Etr|} do
wenxt = SGD
[
Re(wavcur ◦ Φcur)
]
wecur = w
e
nxt
end for
iter = iter + 1
wavcur =
1
|Etr|
∑
e w
e
cur
end for
end while
• Robust min-max training: In this method, we minimize the maximum loss
across the multiple environments.
We have two approaches for EIRM games: one that uses a Φ fixed to the identity
and the other that uses a variable Φ, which we refer to as the F-IRM and
V-IRM game, respectively. The details on architectures, hyperparameters, and
optimizers used for all the methods are in the Appendix Section. The source-code
is available at https://github.com/IBM/IRM-games.
5.2 Datasets
In [1], the comparisons were done on a colored digits MNIST dataset. We create
the same dataset for our experiments. In addition, we also create two other
datasets that are inspired from Colored MNIST: Colored Fashion MNIST and
Colored Desprites. We also create another dataset: Structured Noise Fashion
MNIST. In this dataset, instead of coloring the images to establish spurious
correlations, we create small patches of noise at specific locations in the image,
where the locations are correlated with the labels (detailed description of the
datasets is in the Appendix Section). In all the comparisons, we averaged the
performance of the different approaches over ten runs.
Colored MNIST (Table 1) Standard ERM based approaches, and robust
training based approach achieve between 10-15 percent accuracy on the testing
set. F-IRM game achieves 59.9 ± 2.7 percent testing accuracy. This implies that
the model is not using spurious correlation unlike the ERM based approaches,
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Table 1: Colored MNIST: Comparison of methods in terms of training, testing
accuracy (mean ± std deviation).
Algorithm Train accuracy Test accuracy
ERM 84.88 ± 0.16 10.45 ± 0.66
ERM 1 84.84 ± 0.21 10.86 ± 0.52
ERM 2 84.95 ± 0.20 10.05 ± 0.23
Robust min max 84.25 ± 0.43 15.24 ± 2.45
F-IRM game 63.37 ± 1.14 59.91 ± 2.69
V-IRM game 63.97 ± 1.03 49.06 ± 3.43
IRM 59.27 ± 4.39 62.75 ± 9.59
ERM grayscale 71.81 ± 0.47 71.36± 0.65
Optimal 75 75
Table 2: Colored Fashion MNIST: Comparison of methods in terms of training,
testing accuracy (mean ± std deviation).
Algorithm Train accuracy Test accuracy
ERM 83.17 ± 1.01 22.46 ± 0.68
ERM 1 81.33 ± 1.35 33.34 ± 8.85
ERM 2 84.39 ± 1.89 13.16 ± 0.82
Robust min max 82.81 ± 0.11 29.22 ± 8.56
F-IRM game 62.31 ± 2.35 69.25 ± 5.82
V-IRM game 68.96 ± 0.95 70.19 ± 1.47
IRM 75.01 ± 0.25 55.25 ± 12.42
ERM grayscale 74.79 ± 0.37 74.67± 0.48
Optimal 75 75
and robust training based approach, that is present in the color of the digit.
F-IRM has a comparable mean and a much lower standard deviation than IRM,
which achieves 62.75 ± 9.5 percent. ERM grayscale is ERM on uncolored data,
which is why it is better than all.
Colored Fashion MNIST (Table 2) We observe that the V-IRM game
performs the best both in terms of the mean and the standard deviation achieving
70.2 ± 1.5 percent.
Colored Desprites (Table 3) We observe that V-IRM game achieves 50.0
± 0.2 percent while IRM achieves 51.8 ± 6 percent.
Structured Noise Fashion MNIST (Table 4) We observe that F-IRM
achieves 62.0 ± 2.0 percent and is comparable with IRM that achievs 63.9 ±
10.9 percent; again observe that we have a lower standard deviation.
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Table 3: Colored Desprites: Comparison of methods in terms of training, testing
accuracy (mean ± std deviation).
Algorithm Train accuracy Test accuracy
ERM 85.01 ± 0.03 9.97 ± 0.05
ERM 1 81.33 ± 1.35 33.34 ± 8.85
ERM 2 84.39 ± 1.89 13.16 ± 0.82
Robust min max 84.94 ± 0.09 10.28 ± 0.33
F-IRM game 53.36 ± 1.40 48.61 ± 3.06
V-IRM game 56.31 ± 4.94 50.04 ± 0.15
IRM 52.67 ± 2.40 51.82 ± 5.95
ERM grayscale 67.67 ± 0.58 66.97± 0.69
Optimal 75 75
Table 4: Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Comparison of methods in terms of
training, testing accuracy (mean ± std deviation).
Algorithm Train accuracy Test accuracy
ERM 83.49 ± 1.22 20.13 ± 8.06
ERM 1 81.80 ± 1.50 30.94 ± 1.01
ERM 2 84.66 ± 0.40 11.98 ± 0.23
Robust min max 82.78 ± 1.32 25.59 ± 9.14
F-IRM game 51.54 ± 2.96 62.03 ± 2.02
V-IRM game 47.70 ± 1.69 61.46 ± 0.53
IRM 52.57 ± 9.95 63.92 ± 10.95
ERM no noise 74.79 ± 0.37 74.67± 0.48
Optimal 75 75
5.3 Analyzing the Experiments
In this section, we use plots of F-IRM game played on Colored Fashion MNIST
(plots for both F-IRM and V-IRM on all other datasets are similar and are in the
Appendix Section). In Figure 2, we show the accuracy of the ensemble model on
the entire data and the two environments separately. In the initial stages, the
training accuracy increases and eventually it starts to oscillate. Best response
dynamics can often oscillate [39, 4, 33].
Next, we demistify these oscillations and explain their importance.
5.3.1 Explaining the mechanism of oscillations
The oscillation has two states. In the first state, the ensemble model performs
well 88 % accuracy. In the second state, the accuracy dips to 75 %. In Figure 3,
we plot the correlation between the ensemble model and the color. When the
oscillations appear in training accuracy in Figure 2, the correlation also start to
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Figure 2: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
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Figure 3: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Correlation of the ensemble model
with color
oscillate in Figure 3. In the first state when the model performs well, the model
is heavily correlated (negative correlation) with the color. In the second state,
the model performs worse, observe that the model now has much less correlation
(close to zero) with the color. We ask two questions: (i) Why do the oscillations
persist in the training accuracy plot (Figure 2) and correlation plot (Figure 3)?,
and (ii) How do the oscillations emerge?
Why do the oscillations persist? In our experiments there are two
environments, the labels are binary, and we want to maximize the log-likelihood.
Let sj be the score vector from environment j’s classifier, p be the softmax of s
and y˜ be the one hot encoded vector of labels. The gradient of the log-likelihood
w.r.t. the scores given by each model for a certain instance x (see derivation in
the Appendix Section) is:
∂ log(py)
∂sj
= y¯ − p = e˜. (5)
where e˜ is the error vector. The error e˜ is determined by the both the models
(both models impact p), it backpropagates and impacts individual weights. We
argue next that the examples over which error occur are very different in the
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Figure 4: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Correlations of the individual models
with color
two states and that is the reason for oscillations.
Consider the step when the correlation (absolute value) between the ensemble
model and color is high. In this step, it is the turn of Model 1 to train. Observe
that the accuracy of the model is high because the ensemble model is exploiting
the spurious correlations with the color. We approximate this mathematically.
The score from Model j for Label 1 is s1j−s0j ≈ βtjφncj (x)+γjφcj(x), where φncj are
the features that are not correlated with the color, φcj is the indicator of the color.
From Figure 4, γ1 and γ2 should have opposite signs, i.e. positive and negative
respectively. In the current step, γ2 dominates γ1, which is why the ensemble
model has a heavy negative correlation. The errors (5) that backpropagate come
from the examples for which exploiting spurious correlation with color does
not work, i.e., the color is not indicative of the digit. During this step Model
1 is trained, backpropagation will change the weights such that γ1 increases.
As a result, the ensemble model’s correlation with the color decreases (as we
see in Figure 3). In the next step, it is the turn of Model 2 to train. Model
2’s environment has more examples than environment 1 where exploiting the
color can help improve its accuracy. As a result, error from these examples
backpropagate and γ2 decreases. This brings the ensemble model back to being
negatively correlated with colors and also the training accuracy back to where it
was approximately. This cycle of push and pull between the models continues.
How do these cycles emerge? The oscillations are weak at the beginning
of the training. In the beginning, when Model 2 trains, the impact of the errors
(from examples where spurious correlations can be exploited) on changing the
weights are much stronger than when Model 1 trains, as the number of examples
that benefit from spurious correlations is much larger in comparison. As the
training proceeds, this impact decreases as many examples are classified correctly
by using spurious correlations while the weights continue to accumulate for
Model 1, thus giving rise to oscillations.
How to terminate? We terminate training when the oscillations are stable
and when the ensemble model is in the lower accuracy state, which corresponds
to the state with lower correlation with color. To ensure the oscillations are
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stable, we do not terminate until a certain number of steps have been completed
(in our experiments we set this duration to be number of steps= (training data
size)/(batch size)). To capture the model in a state of lower correlation with
color, we set a threshold on accuracy (we decide the threshold by observing the
accuracy plot); we terminate only when the training accuracy falls below this
threshold.
6 Conclusion
We developed a new framework based on game-theoretic tools to learn invariant
predictors. We work with data from multiple environments. In our framework,
we set up an ensemble game; we construct an ensemble of classifiers with each
environment controlling one portion of the ensemble. Remarkably, the set of
solutions to this game is exactly the same as the set of invariant predictors
across training environments. The proposed framework performs comparably
to the existing framework of [1] and also exhibits lower variance. We hope this
framework opens new ways to address other problems pertaining to invariance
in causal inference using tools from game theory.
7 Appendix
7.1 Examples of hypothesis classes that satisfy affine clo-
sure
• Linear classifiers: The sum of linear functions (polynomial) leads to a
linear function (polynomial), and so does scalar multiplication. Therefore,
linear classifiers satisfy affine closure.
• Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS): RKHS is a Hilbert space,
which is a vector spaces of functions. Therefore, kernel based classifiers
[29] satisfy affine closure.
• Ensemble models: Consider binary classification and boosting models
[30]. Let Hweak be the set of weak learners ω : X → R. The final
function that is input to a sigmoid is w =
∑k
m=1 θmωm, where each
θm ∈ R. The set of functions spanned by the weak learners is defined as
Span(Hweak) = {
∑k
m=1 θmωm|∀m ∈ {1, .., k}, θm ∈ R, k ∈ N}. Span(Hweak)
forms a vector space. Therefore, ensemble models that may use arbitrary
number of weak learners satisfy affine closure.
• Lp spaces. The set of functions f : X → R for which ‖f‖p = [
∫
X |f(x)|pdx]
1
p <
∞ is defined as Lp(X ). Lp(X ) is a vector space [31].
ReLU networks with arbitrary depth: Neural networks are known to
be universal function approximators. Let us assume X to be a compact subset
of Rn. The output of a ReLU network is a continuous function on X , which
implies it is bounded and thus the function described by a ReLU network is in
L1(X ) space. It is clear that the set of functions parametrized by ReLU networks
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are a subset of functions in L1(X ) space. In the other direction, from [40], we
know that ReLU networks can come arbitrarily close to any function in L1 sense.
Since ReLU networks come arbitrarily close to the function and are not exactly
equal we cannot argue that affine closure is satisfied. However, we argue later
that since the networks can arbitrarily approximate any function in L1(X ) it is
sufficient to prove our results (our main result Theorem 1 and Corollary 1).
7.2 Theorems and Proofs
In this section, we discuss the proofs to the lemmas, theorems, and corollaries in
the paper.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then S˜ IV = S˜EIRM
Proof. In the first part, we want to show that S˜ IV ⊆ S˜EIRM. We will use proof
by contradiction.
Let us assume that there exists an element (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜ IV, which
does not belong to S˜EIRM. This implies that there exists at least one e ∈ Etr in
the ensemble game, which strictly prefers the action w¯e ∈ Hw to following its
current action we. In other words, at least one of the inequalities in (3) is not
satisfied, which can be written as
Re
([ w¯e +∑q 6=e wq
|Etr|
]
◦ Φ
)
< Re(w ◦ Φ) (6)
The function w
′
=
w¯e+
∑
q 6=e w
q
|Etr| ∈ Hw (From Assumption 1). Therefore, w
′
is a
strictly better classifier than w with a fixed representation Φ for environment e,
which contradicts the condition that w ∈ arg minw¯∈Hw Re(w¯ ◦ Φ) (which follows
from (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜ IV ).
This proves the first part.
In the second part, we want to show that S˜EIRM ⊆ S˜ IV. Let us assume that
there exists an element (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜EIRM, which does not belong to S˜ IV.
Following Assumption 1, w lies in Hw. Since (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) 6∈ S˜ IV there exists
at least one e ∈ Etr and a classifier w′ ∈ Hw strictly better than w for a fixed
representation Φ. If this were not the case, w will be an invariant predictor w.r.t.
Φ across Etr, which would contradict (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) 6∈ S˜ IV. Therefore
Re(w
′ ◦ Φ) < Re(w ◦ Φ) (7)
Let us construct a new auxiliary classifier w˜e as follows. w˜e = w
′ |Etr|−
∑
q 6=e w
q.
It follows from Assumption 1 that w˜e ∈ Hw. Observe that the ensemble defined
as
w˜e+
∑
q 6=e w
q
|Etr| simplifies to w
′
. This means that environment e can deviate from
we to w˜e ∈ Hw and strictly gain from this deviation. This contradicts the fact
that {wq}|Etr|q=1 is a Nash equilibrium ({wq}|Etr|q=1 is a Nash equilibrium because
(Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜EIRM).
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Corollary 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then Sˆ IV = SˆEIRM
Proof. The proof follows straightaway from Theorem 1. For each w ◦ Φ ∈ Sˆ IV
we look at the corresponding tuple (Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜ IV. From Theorem 1,
(Φ, {wq}|Etr|q=1 , w) ∈ S˜EIRM. Therefore, w ◦ Φ ∈ SˆEIRM. The other side follows the
same way.
7.2.1 Extending Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to ReLU networks
In the proof of Theorem 1, we used the affine closure property in (6) and (7).
However, in (6) and (7), we only need to construct models that can achieve risk
arbitrarily close to the models in the LHS of equations (6) and (7). Let Hw the
set of functions of ReLU networks with arbitrary depth defined on compact sets
X . These functions are in L1 class as explained earlier. From [40], we can choose
ReLU networks from Hw that approximate the classifiers in the LHS of (6) and
(7) arbitrarily. We elaborate on this. Suppose the function to be approximated
in the LHS is f . From [40], for each  > 0, there exists a ReLU network fˆ such
that EX [|f − fˆ |] ≤ . The question is does EX [|f − fˆ |] ≤  also ensure that the
difference in risks is mitigated |Re(f, Y )−Re(fˆ , Y )| ≤ ˜. If the loss function ` is
Lipschitz in the scores (e.g., cross-entropy loss, hinge loss), then if the functions
are arbitrarily close the risks will also be arbitrarily close. We show this below.
|Re(f, Y )−Re(fˆ , Y )|
= |Ee[`(f(X), Y )− `(fˆ(X), Y )]|
≤ Ee[|`(f(X), Y )− `(fˆ(X), Y )|]
≤ Ee[L|f(X)− fˆ(X)|]
(8)
where L is the Lipschitz constant for `.
Below we illustrate an example of Lipschitz continuous loss `. Consider cross
entropy for binary classification (labels Y = 0 and Y = 1). Suppose f(x) = s is
the score assigned to class 1, it is converted into probability as es/(1 + es). The
cross-entropy loss is simplified as
`(s, Y ) = Y s− log(1 + es) (9)
Observe ∂`(s,Y )∂s = Y − 11+es and |∂`(s,Y )∂s | ≤ 1. Therefore, `(s, Y ) is Lispchitz
continuous in s.
Lemma 1. If Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied, then for any w
′ ∈ Hw and
Φ ∈ HΦ, w′ ◦ Φ−1 ∈ Lp(Z).
Proof. To show w
′◦Φ−1 ∈ Lp(Z) let us first express the integral ∫Z |w′(Φ−1(z))|pdz
by using substitution rules [41]. We can use the substitution rule because both
X and Z are n dimensional, the function Φ is bijective, differentiable and
Lipshitz continuous (From Asumption 2 and 3). Substitute z = Φ(x). Then,
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∫
Z |w
′
(Φ−1(z))|pdz = ∫
Φ−1(Z) |w
′
(x)|pdet(J(Φ(x)))dx . Here J(Φ(x)) is the Ja-
cobian of the transformation Φ. Since Φ is a Lipschitz continuous map, its
determinant is also bounded. We show this as follows.
Lipschitz continuity implies that for any x, x′ ∈ X , ‖Φ(x)−Φ(x′)‖ ≤ γ‖x−x′‖
where γ is the Lipschitz constant. In particular, since Φ(·) is differentiable
(Assumption 2), this means that the length of any partial derivative vector
‖ δΦ(x)δxi ‖ ≤ γ for any coordinate i ∈ [n]. Now, we apply the Hadamard inequality
[42] for the determinant of the square matrix J(Φ(x)):
det(J(Φ(x))) ≤ ∏
i∈[n]
‖ δΦ(x)δxi ‖ ≤ γn. Therefore,
∫
Z
|w′(Φ−1(z))|pdz =
∫
Φ−1(Z)
|w′(x)|pdet(J(Φ(x)))dx
≤ γn
∫
Φ−1(Z)
|w′(x)|pdx
≤ γn
∫
X
|w′(x)|pdx (10)
Since, w ∈ Lp(X ) (Assumption 3) we have that w′ ◦ Φ−1 ∈ Lp(Z) from the
above inequality.
Theorem 2. If Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied and S¯ IVZ is not empty, then
S¯ IVZ = Sˆ IVX (I) = SˆEIRMX (I)
Proof. In the first part, we want to show that S¯ IVZ ⊆ Sˆ IVX (I). We will use proof
by contradiction.
Suppose (w◦Φ) ∈ S¯ IVZ but not in Sˆ IVX (I). First note that w◦Φ ∈ Lp(X ) (From
definition of the set S¯ IVZ ). This implies that there must exist an environment
e and a classifier w
′
: X → Y which is better than (w ◦ Φ). Therefore, we can
state that
Re(w
′
) < Re(w ◦ Φ) (11)
Define a classifier w˜ = w
′ ◦Φ−1. From Lemma 1 it follows w˜ ∈ Lp(Z). Define
the risk achieved by this classifier as Re(w˜ ◦ Φ). We simplify this as follows.
Re(w˜ ◦ Φ) = Re((w′ ◦ Φ−1) ◦ Φ) =
Re(w
′ ◦ (Φ−1 ◦ Φ)) = Re(w′ ◦ I) = Re(w′)
(12)
Therefore, the risk of w˜ ◦ Φ is better than the risk achieved by w ◦ Φ. This
contradicts that w ◦ Φ is an invariant predictor. We show this as follows.
Since w ◦ Φ is an invariant predictor with Φ as the representation it implies
w ∈ arg minw¯ Re(w¯ ◦ Φ). However, w˜ is clearly better than w with Φ as the
representation (12) , which leads to a contradiction. This proves the first part.
The second side Sˆ IVX (I) ⊆ S¯ IVZ . Suppose w ∈ Sˆ IVX (I) but not in S¯ IVZ . Select any
Φ : X → Z from the set of representations for which invariant predictors exist
in the set S¯ IVZ (recall that we assumed S¯ IVZ is not empty). Define a predictor
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w˜ = w ◦ Φ−1. Since w ∈ Lp(X ), from Lemma 1 we know that w˜ is in Lp(Z).
There should exist an environment e for which w˜ is not the optimal classifier
given Φ otherwise w will be in the set S¯ IVZ , which would be a contradiction. Φ is
a representation for which an invariant predictor exists, let w
′
be the classifier
and w′ ◦Φ be the invariant predictor in S¯ IVZ . ∃ an environment e for which w
′
is
strictly better than w˜ given Φ. We write this condition as
Re(w
′ ◦ Φ) < Re(w˜ ◦ Φ) = Re(w) (13)
w
′ ◦Φ ∈ S¯ IVZ and from the definition of the set it follows that w
′ ◦Φ ∈ Lp(X ).
Also, w
′ ◦ Φ is better than w from (13). However, w is an invariant predictor
with Φ = I, which leads to contradiction.
From Theorem 2 it follows that SˆEIRMX (I) = Sˆ IVX (I). This completes the
proof.
When Φ = I, can the game recover the solution that focuses on
causal parents? We will consider the following data generation process. The
data for each environment is generated by i.i.d. sampling (Xe, Y e) from the
following generative model. Assume a subset S∗ ⊂ {1, ..., n} is causal for the
label Y e. For all the environments e, Xe has an arbitrary distribution and
Y e ← g(XeS∗) + e
where XeS∗ is the vector X
e with indices in S∗, g : [−u, u]|S∗| → R is some
underlying function and e ∼ F e, E[e] = 0, e ⊥ XeS∗ . We assume g ∈
Lp([−u, u]|S∗|) andHw = Lp([−u, u]|S∗|). Let ` be the squared error loss function.
We fix the representation Φ∗(Xe) = XeS∗ . With Φ
∗ as the representation, the
optimal classifier w among all the functions is g(XeS∗) (this follows from the
generative model). For each environment e, we∗ = g is the optimal classifier in
Hw. Therefore, we∗ ◦ Φ∗ = g is the invariant predictor. Since Hw is affine closed
1
|Etr|
∑
e w
e
∗ ◦Φ∗ is an invariant predictor obtained from the EIRM game. Define
a function g˜(Xe) = g(XeS∗). Since g ∈ Lp([−u, u]|S
∗|), g˜ ∈ Lp([−u, u]n). We
claim that Φ = I elicits g˜ ◦ I as an invariant predictor. Suppose this was not the
case then for some environment e, there exists gˆ ∈ Lp([−u, u]n) which achieves
a lower risk than g˜, i.e. Re(gˆ) < Re(g˜). Consider
min
g¯∈Lp([−u,u]n)
E[(Y e − g¯)2]
We simplify the objective as follows
E[(Y e − g¯)2] = E[(g − g¯)2 + (e)2 + 2(g − g¯)e] = E[(g − g¯)2 + (e)2] ≥ E[(e)2]
g¯ = g˜ is an optimal solution since E[(Y e − g˜)2] = E[(e)2]. This contradicts
that E[(Y e − gˆ)2] < E[(Y e − g˜)2].
Therefore, to conclude even when Φ = I the EIRM game will recover the
invariant predictor that focuses on the causal parents of Y .
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When Φ = I, can the game recover the solution when causal parents
are not directly observed?
We consider a similar generative process as described above except, we now
assume that the causal features are not directly observed
Y e ← g(ZeS∗) + e
where ZeS∗ is the vector Z
e with indices in S∗, g : [−u, u]|S∗| → R, g ∈
Lp([−u, u]|S∗|). We assume that we do not observe Ze directly and instead
observe Xe ← f(Ze), where f is an invertible map. In addition, we assume that
f satisfies the Assumption 2. Let Φ∗ = f−1 and define PS∗ as the projection
function that projects the input onto indices in S∗. Observe that g ◦ PS∗ ◦
f−1(Xe) = g(ZeS∗). Fix w
∗
e = g ◦ PS∗ . Therefore we∗ ◦ Φ∗ is an invariant
predictor. Observe that g ◦ PS∗ ∈ Hw = Lp([−u, u]n). Since Hw is affine closed
1
|Etr|
∑
e w
e
∗ ◦ Φ∗ is an invariant predictor obtained from the EIRM game.
What happens when Φ = I? Is (g ◦ PS∗ ◦ f−1) ◦ I an invariant predictor?
Note that g ◦ PS∗ ◦ f−1 ∈ Lp([−u, u]n) (To see why this is the case, use the
following observations. g ◦PS∗ ∈ Lp([−u, u]n), f satisfies Assumption 2, and use
Lemma 1). From the generative model it is clear that there cannot be another
classifier that is strictly better than g ◦PS∗ ◦f−1 for any environment. Therefore,
g ◦PS∗ ◦ f−1 is indeed an invariant predictor. Since g ◦PS∗ ◦ f−1 ∈ Lp([−u, u]n)
and Lp([−u, u]n) is affine closed, g ◦ PS∗ ◦ f−1 is also a solution obtained from
the EIRM game with Φ = I.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 4 is satisfied, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game ΓEIRM exists. If the weights of all the individuals in the NE are in
the interior of Hw, then the corresponding ensemble predictor is an invariant
predictor among all linear models.
Proof. We will use the classic result from [43], which shows the sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in continuous action games.
We provide this result in the next section Theorem 5, where we continue the
discussion on concepts in game theory. Informally speaking, the result states
that if the game is concave with compact and convex action sets, then the pure
Nash equilibrium exists.
The set of actions of each environment Hw is a closed bounded and convex
subset (following the Assumption 4). Recall the definition of the utility of a
player e in the EIRM game is given as
ue[w
e, w−e,Φ] = −Re(wav ◦ Φ) =
= −Ee[`((wav ◦ Φ)(x), Y )] (14)
Following Assumption 4, we simplify the inner term in the expectation as
follows.
`((wav ◦ Φ)(x), Y ) = `(Φ(x)t[ 1|Etr|
|Etr|∑
q=1
wq], Y ) (15)
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`(Φ(x)tw, Y ) = hY (w). hY (w) is a convex function of w (From Assumption 4).
Define g : Rd×Rd...×Rd → Rd as g(w1, ...,w|Etr|) = 1|Etr|
∑
k w
k. Note that g is
an affine mapping. The function in (15) can be expressed as hY (g(w
1, ...w|Etr|)).
The composition of a convex function with an affine function is also convex [44].
We use this to conclude that the composition hY (g(w
1, ...w|Etr|)) is a convex
function in w1, ...w|Etr|. We express (14) in terms of h and g as
ue[w
e, w−e,Φ] = −Ee[hY (g(w1, ...w|Etr|))] (16)
Each term inside the expectation above is concave. Therefore, ue is concave
in we (follows directly from Jensen’s inequality applied to ue). hY is a continuous
function in w (from Assumption 4) and g is a continuous function as well, the
composition of the two continuous functions is also continuous. As a result ue
is continuous. Therefore, the EIRM game above satisfies the assumptions in
Theorem 5 ([43], which implies that a pure NE exists. This proves the first part
of the theorem. We now discuss the second part of the which provides a simple
condition for the existence of invariant predictor.
Say the weights that comprise one of the NE are given as {wq∗}|Etr|q=1 . This set
of weights satisfy
we∗ = arg min
we∈Hw
−ue(we, w−e∗ ,Φ) (17)
From Assumption 4, we∗ is in the interior of Hw. Therefore, we can construct
a ball around it in which it is the smallest point, which implies it is a local
minima of −ue(we, w−e∗ ,Φ). Since local minima is also the global minima for
convex functions; it follows that the solution would be equivalent to searching
over the space of all the linear functions, i.e.
we∗ = arg min
we∈Rd
−ue(we, w−e∗ ,Φ) (18)
The above argument holds for all the environments because each solution we∗ is
in the interior. Therefore, we can transform the EIRM game from the current
restricted space Hw to the space of all the linear functions. The space of the
linear functions satisfy affine closure property unlike the space of bounded
linear functions Hw. From Theorem 1 it follows that the ensemble classifier
1
|Etr|
∑|Etr|
q=1 w
q
∗ composed with Φ will be an invariant predictor.
In Theorem 3 we assumed that the model and the representation are both
linear functions. We now discuss the existence under a more general class of
models.
Assumption 5 Hw is a family of functions parametrized by θ ∈ Θ. We
assume that Θ is compact. We assume wθ ∈ Hw, where wθ : Rd → R is
continuous in its inputs.
Consider a multilayer perceptron (MLP) with say ReLU activation. Each
weight in the network belongs [wmin, wmax]. This family of neural networks
satisfies the Assumption 5 above.
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Suppose that each environment is looking to solve for a probability distribu-
tion over the parameters of the neural network written as vector we given as
pwe . We rewrite the expected loss of the environments as follows.
u¯e(pwe , pw−e , pΦ) = EΠepwe×pΦ
[
ue(w
e, w−e,Φ)
]
. We use u¯e as the utility of each environment in the EIRM game.
Theorem 4. If Assumption 5 is satisfied, then a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
of ΓEIRM is guaranteed to exist.
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the existence result [45], which we
restate in Theorem 7.
The main message of the above theorem is that we relax the requirement of
having a deterministic classifier, then we are guaranteed to have a solution for
general models as well.
7.3 Game Theory Concepts Continued
This section is a continuation to the Section 3.1 on Game Theory Concepts.
We discuss some classic results on the existence of NE. Let us now consider
continuous action games. We make the following assumption.
Assumption NE 1 For each i:
• Si is a compact, convex subset of Rni
• ui(si, s−i) is continuous in s−i
• ui(si, s−i) is continuous and concave in si .
Theorem 5. [43] If Assumption NE 1 is satisfied for game Γ, then a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
We extend the definition of pure strategy NE to mixed strategies (discussion
on mixed strategies given in the next section, where we continue the discussion on
concepts in game theory), where instead of choosing an action deterministically,
each player chooses a probability distribution over the set of actions. We assume
that each set Si is a compact subset of Rni . Define the set of Lesbegue measures
over Si as ∆(Si). Each player i, draws a probability distribution θi from ∆(Si).
The joint strategy played by all the players is the product of their individual
distributions written as Πk∈Nθk
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. A strategy θ∗ = Πk∈Nθ∗k is said
to be a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) if it satisfies
Eθ∗
[
ui(Si, S
∗
−i)
]
≥ Eθ∗−i
[
ui(k, S−i)
]
,∀k ∈ Si,∀i
where θ∗−i = Πk 6=iθ
∗
k.
Theorem 6. [46] Every finite game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Next, we relax some of the above assumptions.
Assumption NE 2 For each i
• Si is a non empty, compact subset of Rni
• ui(si, s−i) is continuous in si and s−i
Theorem 7. [45] If Assumption NE 2 is satisfied, then the game has a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium.
7.4 Deriving the expression for backpropagation
For instance x, the predicted score from Environment 1,2 (Model 1,2) for class k
is given as wk1 ◦ x, wk2 ◦ x respectively, where wkj is the score output by neural
network j for class k. The overall score is given as wk1 ◦ x+wk2 ◦ x. We take the
softmax to get the overall probability for class k as
pk =
exp
[
wk1 ◦ x+ wk2 ◦ x
]
∑
j exp
[
wj1 ◦ x+ wj2 ◦ x
] (19)
The softmax vector is p = [p0, p1]. Denote w
k
j ◦ x = skj . The log-likelihood for
instance x with label y is given as
log[py]
= wy1 ◦ x+ wy2 ◦ x− log
(∑
j
exp
[
wj1 ◦ x+ wj2 ◦ x
])
= sy1 + s
y
2 − log
(∑
j
exp
[
sj1 + s
j
2
]) (20)
The gradient of log-likelihood w.r.t score of each model is given as
∂ log[py]
∂skj
= I(k = y)−
exp
[
sk1 + s
k
2
]
∑
j exp
[
sj1 + s
j
2
]
= I(k = y)− pk
(21)
We convert y into a one hot encoded vector y¯ and simplify the above expression
as
∂ log[pu]
∂sj
= y¯ − p = e˜ (22)
7.5 Computing Environment
The experiments were done on 2.3 GHZ Intel Core i9 processor with 32 GB
memory (2400 MHz DDR4).
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7.6 Description of the Datasets
7.6.1 Colored MNIST Digits
We use the exact same environment as in [1]. [1] propose to create an environment
for training to classify digits in MNIST digits data 5, where the images in MNIST
are now colored in such a way that the colors spuriously correlate with the labels.
The task is to classify whether the digit is less than 5 (not including 5) or more
than 5. There are three environments (two training containing 30,000 points
each, one test containing 10,000 points) We add noise to the preliminary label
(y˜ = 0 if digit is between 0-4 and y˜ = 1 if the digit is between 5-9) by flipping
it with 25 percent probability to construct the final label. We sample the color
id z by flipping the final labels with probability pe, where pe is 0.2 in the first
environment, 0.1 in the second environment, and 0.9 in the third environment.
The third environment is the testing environment. We color the digit red if z = 1
or green if z = 0.
7.6.2 Colored Fashion MNIST
We modify the fashion MNIST dataset 6 in a manner similar to the MNIST digits
dataset. Fashion MNIST data has images from different categories: “t-shirt”,
“trouser”, “pullover”, “dress”, “coat”, “sandal”, “shirt”, “sneaker”, “bag”, “ankle
boots”. We add colors to the images in such a way that the colors correlate with
the labels. The task is to classify whether the image is that of foot wear or a
clothing item. There are three environments (two training, one test) We add
noise to the preliminary label (y˜ = 0: “t-shirt”, “trouser”, “pullover”, “dress”,
“coat”, “shirt” and y˜ = 1: “sandle”, “sneaker”, “ankle boots”) by flipping it
with 25 percent probability to construct the final label. We sample the color
id z by flipping the noisy label with probability pe, where pe is 0.2 in the first
environment, 0.1 in the second environment, and 0.9 in the third environment,
which is the test environment. We color the object red if z = 1 or green if z = 0.
7.6.3 Colored Desprites Dataset
We modify the Desprites dataset 7 in a manner similar to the MNIST digits
dataset. The task is to classify if the image is a circle or a square. We take
the preliminary binary labels y˜ = 0 for a circle and y˜ = 1 for a square. We
add noise to the preliminary label by flipping it with 25 percent probability to
construct the final label. We sample the color id z by flipping the noisy label
with probability pe, where pe is 0.2 in the first environment, 0.1 in the second
environment, and 0.9 in the third environment, which is the test environment.
We color the object red if z = 1 or green if z = 0.
5https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/keras/datasets/mnist/load_data
6https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/keras/datasets/fashion_mnist/
load_data
7https://github.com/deepmind/dsprites-dataset
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7.6.4 Structured Noise in Fashion MNIST
In the previous three experiments, we used color in the images to create correla-
tions. In this experiment, we use a different mechanism to create correlations in
Fashion MNIST dataset. We add a small square (3× 3), in the top left corner of
some images and an even smalller square (2 × 2) in the bottom right corner of
other images. The location of the box is correlated with labels. The preliminary
labels are the same as in the other experiment with Fashion MNIST. There are
three environments (two training, one test). We add noise to the preliminary
label by flipping it with 25 percent probability to construct the final label. We
sample the location id z by flipping the noisy label with probability pe, where
pe is 0.2 in the first environment, 0.1 in the second environment, and 0.9 in the
third environment, which is the test environment. We place the square in the
top left if z = 1 or bottom right if z = 0.
7.6.5 Architecture, Hyperparameter and Training Details
Architecture for 2 player EIRM game with fixed Φ
In the game with fixed Φ, we used the following architecture for the two models.
The model used is a simple multilayer perceptron with following parameters.
• Input layer: Input batch (batch, len,wid, depth) → Flatten
• Layer 1: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
• Layer 2: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
• Output layer: Fully connected layer, output size = 2
We use the above architecture across all the experiments. The shape of the input
in the above architecture depends on the dimensions of the data that are input.
Architecture for 2 player EIRM game with variable Φ
In the game with variable Φ, we used the following architecture.
The architecture for the representation learner is
• Input layer: Input batch (batch, len,wid, depth) → Flatten
• Layer 1: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
• Output layer: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
The output from the representation learner above is fed into two MLPs one
for each environment (we use the same architecture for both environments).
• Layer 1: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
• Layer 2: Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ELU,
L2-regularizer = 1.25e-3, Dropout = 0.75
• Output layer: Fully connected layer, output size = 2
We use the above architecture across all the experiments. The shape of the input
in the above architecture depends on the dimensions of the data that are input.
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Optimizer and other hyperparameters We used Adam optimizer for
training with learning rate set to 2.5e-4. We optimize the cross-entropy loss
function. We set the batch size to 256. We terminate the algorithm according
to the rules we explained in the paper. Thus the number of training steps can
vary across different trials. There is a warm start phase for all the methods; we
set the warm start phase to be equal to the number of steps in one epoch, where
one epoch is the (training data size/ batch size). For the setup with fixed Φ, we
set the period to be 2, i.e. in one step first model trains and in the other step
the second model trains and this cycle repeats throughout the training. For the
setup with variable Φ, we let the two environments and representation learner
take turns to update their respective models, environment 1 trains in one step,
environment 2 trains in the next step, representation learner trains, and this
cycle continues.
Architecture for IRM [1]
We used the same architecture that they described in the github repository.
8. We describe their architecture below.
• Input layer: Input batch (batch, len,wid, depth) → Flatten
• Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ReLU, L2-regularizer
= 1.1e-3
• Fully connected layer, output size = 390, activation = ReLU, L2-regularizer
= 1.1e-3
• Output layer: Fully connected layer, output size= 2
Optimizer, hyperparameters and some remarks We used Adam optimizer
for training with learning rate set to 4.89e-4. We optimize the cross-entropy loss
function. We set the batch size to 256. The total number of steps is set to 500.
The penalty weight is set to 91257. The penalty term is only used after 190
steps. The code from [1] uses a normalization trick to the loss to avoid gradient
explosion. We found that this strategy was not useful in all settings. Therefore,
we carried out experiments for both the cases (with and without normalization
of loss) and report the case for which the accuracy is higher.
7.7 Figures Continued
In this section, we provide the figures for all the datasets and for both V-IRM
and F-IRM game. In Figure 2-4 in the Experiments Section, we let each model
in its turn use ltr (ltr=5) SGD step updates before the turn of the next model.
We show the figure with ltr=5 to visually illustrate the oscillations better. In our
experiments (Table 1-4) we set ltr =1; we show the figures corresponding to all
our experiments (Table 1-4) in Figure 5-36. The captions under the plot describe
the dataset and the corresponding game (F-IRM/V-IRM). All the plots in Figure
5-36 use the termination criteria we described in the Experiments Section. We
observe the same trends that we observed and explained in Experiments Section
across all the figures.
To illustrate what happens if we let the training go on, in Figure 36-40 we
8https://github.com/facebookresearch/InvariantRiskMinimization
27
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Training steps
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
cc
ur
ac
y
Entire data
Environment 1
Environment 2
Figure 5: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Training steps
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
di
ffe
er
en
ce
 (e
2-
 e
1)
Figure 6: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments
let the training for V-IRM on Desprites dataset continue for many more training
steps. Figures 36-40 illustrate that the oscillations are stable and persist. As a
result, we continue to encounter the state in which the ensemble does not exploit
spurious correlations.
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Figure 7: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Ensemble’s correlation with color
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Figure 8: F-IRM, Colored Fashion MNIST: Compare individual model correla-
tions
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Figure 9: V-IRM Colored Fashion MNIST: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
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Figure 10: V-IRM Colored Fashion MNIST: Difference in accuracy of the
ensemble model between the two environments
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Figure 11: V-IRM Colored Fashion MNIST: Ensemble’s correlation with color
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Figure 12: V-IRM Colored Fashion MNIST: Compare individual model correla-
tions.
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Figure 13: F-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
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Figure 14: F-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments
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Figure 15: F-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Ensemble’s correlation with color
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Figure 16: F-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Compare individual model correlations.
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Figure 17: V-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
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Figure 18: V-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments
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Figure 19: V-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Ensemble’s correlation with color
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Figure 20: V-IRM Colored Digits MNIST: Compare individual model correlations
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Figure 21: F-IRM Colored Desprites: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
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Figure 22: F-IRM Colored Desprites: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments
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Figure 23: F-IRM Colored Desprites: Ensemble’s correlation with color
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Figure 24: F-IRM Colored Desprites: Compare individual model correlations
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Figure 25: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Comparing accuracy of ensemble
0 200 400
Training steps
0.00
0.05
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
di
ffe
er
en
ce
 (e
2-
 e
1)
A
cc
ur
ac
y 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
Training 
steps
Figure 26: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments
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Figure 27: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Correlation of the ensemble model with
color
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Figure 28: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Compare individual model correlations
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Figure 29: F-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Comparing accuracy of
ensemble
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Figure 30: F-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Difference in accuracy of
the ensemble model between the two environments
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Figure 31: F-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Correlation of the ensemble
model with color
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Figure 32: F-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Individual model correlation
with color
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Figure 33: V-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Comparing accuracy of
ensemble
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Figure 34: V-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Difference in accuracy of
the ensemble model between the two environments,
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Figure 35: V-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Ensemble’s correlation
with color
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Figure 36: V-IRM Structured Noise Fashion MNIST: Individual model correlation
with color
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Figure 37: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Comparing accuracy of ensemble (More
train steps)
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Figure 38: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Difference in accuracy of the ensemble
model between the two environments (More train steps)
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Figure 39: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Ensemble’s correlation with color (More
train steps)
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Figure 40: V-IRM Colored Desprites: Individual model correlations (More train
steps)
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